The Revisenik

Tuesday, March 06, 2017
The Travel Ban--Revised--

Tuesday, March 6, 2017

#YEMENRAID--Actionable Intel--A Revision

(CANTINA ONE)-- Based on what the objectives were for the mission  January 29  on the Yaklaa village, commanders admit no actionable intel was gathered from the operation. But that depends on the perspective. Consider what has been learned when placing the actionable intel into context with all of the intel surrounding the raid.

The US administration was a relative newbie and in the tight circle of advisers, all were eager, perhaps too eager, to agree to the plan, which hadn't been thoroughly vetted. There was possibly no dissent, no Devil's Advocate, the so-called "Tenth Man", or as found in the IDF, The "Ipcha Mistabra".

What hadn't been taken into account was the following, that now proves to be very significant intelligence:

1.) The enemy is keenly aware of the Modus Operandi of the field units involved in the raids, from prior experience since the plan was all too similar to previous raids that did not accomplish objectives.

2.) The moonless night requirement is an all too obvious giveaway to the enemy and they are well prepared to post whatever additional security forces are necessary during the dark of the moon. This is the first obvious piece of in-context intel gathered.

3.) Willingness of locals to defend their village, in spite of who it might harbor, against interlopers and intruders, for whatever reason they might drop in. Completely overlooked and ignored by mission planners, the reaction by the average villager.

4.) Although collateral damage may be a consideration for friendly forces, it appears it means nothing to the enemy, willing to engage in close quarter firefights and ambushes with the intruders in the presence of civilians, in particular women and children.

5.) The willingness of the enemy to recruit female combatants to engage the invading force, and keep it pinned down in heavy crossfire in order to maximize casualties.

6.) The over dependence on military hardware during an emergency exfiltration, where casualties become a burden to the invading force, requiring mission objective components to be scrapped in  order to commence rescue operations.

7.) The bottom line is the overall awareness of the execution of the plan, the knowledge of the tactical blueprint by the enemy; making it apparent to him just exactly how to disperse forces, engage, ambush, contain and reject the attack wholesale. The plan is flawed by the fact that it is far too similar to previous missions, in terms of deployment and hardware.

In the end, nobody objected to a few basic oversights (an unintentional failure to notice or do something.) by at least one person in the planning department, there was no Israeli Ipcha Mistabra, or Tenth Man.


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